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Abstract
A holdup problem on workers' skill investment can arise when employers adopt discriminatory hir-
ing norm to extract higher than socially optimal proﬁt. When hiring priority is determined by both
productivity-dependent (skill level) and -independent characteristics (discrimination), skill investment
decision becomes strategic between the discriminated and favored group. We consider frictional markets
with either posted or bargained wage (ﬁxed sharing rule). With posted wage, depending on market tight-
ness there may be equilibrium or multiple equilibria on skill investment. With discriminatory hiring, if
in equilibrium both groups stay high skilled, both are worse oﬀ and ﬁrms better oﬀ; In any equilibrium
where one group underinvest, the other group remain high skilled and are better oﬀ, while ﬁrms are worse
oﬀ with discrimination. With bargained wage, similar equilibrium where the favored group underinvest
exists, and ﬁrms incur cost for an intermediate range of bargaining power when they discriminate.
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1 Introduction
A holdup problem arises when some investment is sunk ex ante by one party, and the payoﬀ is shared
with that one party's trading partner. Since cost has no other use once sunk, that trading partner will have
every incentive to squeeze the proﬁt at the ex post stage. In an important study on such a problem in a
labor market with search friction, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b) show that with ﬁrms' sinking capital and
ex post wage bargaining, the equilibrium is always ineﬃcient, since wages paid ex post can be so high such
that ﬁrms' ex ante incentive of investment is harmed; while if ﬁrms are able to post wages to direct workers'
search, then the holdup problem to ﬁrms' investment no longer appears; the eﬃciency can be achieved,
because wage posting allows workers to observe oﬀers and choose where to apply, and it induces workers
to optimize their expected payoﬀ from application by making trade-oﬀ between every wage they observe
and the probability of obtaining it. Within conventional wage posting framework, we spot another source of
ineﬃciency in a holdup problem where workers sink skill investment cost: when the market is crowded for the
ﬁrms, by adopting a discriminatory hiring norm ﬁrms are able to expropriate higher than socially optimal
level of proﬁt, and this has the consequence of discouraging the investment incentives for both the favored
and discriminated groups. We analyze the impact of such rent seeking behavior of ﬁrms on the structure of
market segmentation, and on the workers' skill investment incentives.
When discrimination is absent, the wage posting economy with workers' ex ante skill investment attains
eﬃciency in the equilibria, and we show which equilibrium emerges depends on the rivalry between the
log return to skill and the market tightness (workers/ﬁrms ratio) which measures the degree of market
competition. The fundamental reason behind this eﬃciency result is that skill achievement is a quality which
can be legally written into the wage contracts. It is a diﬀerent story when other (binary) characteristics which
are not closely related to productivity, such as gender, race, height, origin etc. enter also into ﬁrms' preference.
Under equal pay legislation, posted wages can not be conditioned explicitly on these characteristics; however,
if ﬁrms still select workers according to their preference on these characteristics, a separating equilibrium
can result where separate ﬁrms post diﬀerent levels of wages, and workers of diﬀerent groups sort themselves
and apply to diﬀerent wages: the market is then endogenously segregated. On the side of ﬁrms, they have
incentive to adopt such discriminatory hiring norm, when workers' return to skill investment is suﬃciently
high; in that case discrimination allows them to grasp higher than the socially optimal level of operating
proﬁt. On the side of the workers, it proves that both the discriminated group and favored group are worse
oﬀ: for the former, it is because discrimination discretely reduces the labor market opportunity of these
workers, who anticipate discrimination, then demand lower wages, which makes them cheaper to hire; for
the latter, it is so because when ﬁrms are able to hire the discriminated workers cheaply, it is as if ﬁrms
enjoy larger market power, which allows them to suppress further the undiscriminated workers' expected
payoﬀ. Naturally, anticipating discrimination, all groups expect lower payoﬀ from search, jeopardizing their
skill investment incentives.
A key feature of our study is the multidimensionality of characteristics based on which workers are
ranked. On one hand, there is ranking by productivity-dependent type identity: workers are either high
skilled (type H) or low skilled (type L); high skilled have priority to low skilled simply because such ranking
gives ﬁrms higher proﬁt. On the other hand, there is ranking by productivity-independent group identity:
workers belong either to the favored (group a) or the discriminated group (group b). The resulting ranking
schedule has the following order: aH  bH  aL  bL. It reads: given any skill level, group a are preferred
to group b; the high skilled are always preferred to low skilled. Under such an intertwined ranking order,
the skill investment decision for diﬀerent groups becomes strategically interdependent. Focusing on Nash
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pure strategy equilibrium on skill investment, in the wage posting economy, we ﬁnd that depending on the
value of market tightness there can be equilibrium or multiple equilibria on skill investment due to that
interdependence. Compared to the case without discrimination, when the market is very crowded (market
tightness is small) for the ﬁrms, discrimination is proﬁtable for ﬁrms and all the workers are worse oﬀ;
as the tightness further increases, both group can choose low skill and in equilibrium whenever one group
underinvest, the other group remain high skilled and are better oﬀ, while the ﬁrms are worse oﬀ with
discrimination. In particular, the equilibrium where the favored group underinvest, while the discriminated
group choose to remain high skilled exists; And in this case ﬁrms' proﬁts drop since workers' underinvestment
in skill leads to lower average productivity in the economy compared to the case where discrimination is
absent.
In the economy where wages are bargained (determined according to a ﬁxed sharing rule) after matching
hence do not direct search, we ﬁnd similar equilibrium where the favored group underinvest, hence earn lower
expected payoﬀ compared to the case without discrimination within a certain region of bargaining power;
in such an equilibrium, surplus is transferred from ﬁrms and favored group to discriminated group. Firms'
proﬁts are piecewise monotone, because increase of workers' bargaining power can increase workers' incentive
of skill investment, hence discretely improves the market skill composition and average productivity. We
also ﬁnd that there is an intermediate range of workers' bargaining power for values of which ﬁrms are
worse oﬀ by discriminating, due to discouraged skill investment from discriminated group. All in all, the
key diﬀerence between wage posting and wage bargaining is that the actual wage now exogenously pegs on
the productivity, and ﬁrms can no longer manipulate their market power by translating their discriminatory
preference into constantly lower wages.
1.1 Relation to the literature
Job search process is an important channel through which discrimination keeps functioning in the labor
market. Several papers have highlighted the impact of discrimination through job search channel to the
wages gaps. To name a few, Pendakur and Woodcock (2010) show that the existent glass ceilings for the
immigrant and minority workers may be attributed by large measure to their poor access to the jobs in
high-wage ﬁrms; As well, in an important article from Ritter and Taylor (2011), they show that most of
the disparity in unemployment rate could not be explained by cognitive skills that emerge at an early stage,
although for wage gap it could be the case. This result concerning the unemployment disparity is conﬁrmed
by the ﬁnding that this disparity is still signiﬁcant even for workers of similar skill levels.
Our work is most closely related to the directed search literature1. In this literature, search frictions
are derived endogenously through agents' sequential strategic interactions. Taking into account strategic
interaction allows search externality to be internalized. The resulting economy remains competitive, albeit
with a non-Walrasian market structure, and prices play an allocative role to achieve eﬃciency. To the best
of our knowledge, among the discrimination literature with search friction, only two of them are built upon
wage posting context. Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005, hereafter LMD) show that a discriminatory hiring
rule could lead to labor market segmentation and signiﬁcant wage gap with even a negligible diﬀerence in
productivity; however, the discriminated group turn out to have lower unemployment rate, which is in sharp
contrast with evidence. Merlino (2012) aims at improving the result of LMD (2005). He considers further the
1This literature is sometimes also termed as wage posting game with coordination friction
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pre-matching investment from the ﬁrms' side, and obtain technology dispersion and realistic unemployment
gap. His results rely on the strong assumption that there is more discrimination in the high technology
sector, and he is silent on the workers' skill levels. Our paper diﬀers from theirs, in that our focus is to
analyze how hiring discrimination could distort workers' skill investment incentives and the structure of
market segmentation.
While the setup of wage bargaining (no information of level of wage before matching) is more prevalent, it
neglects an important trade-oﬀ that the workers make to some extent in their search for jobs: the wage and
the probability of obtaining it. This endogenous link between wage and employment probability is especially
important, since wages convey information on whether the employers discriminate. Having information of
wages available before matching, workers are able to adjust accordingly their search strategy to avoid being
discriminated. Workers apply to certain wage only when their expected payoﬀ (wage times the employment
probability) from this application attains certain level, and a high wage which attracts also the favored
group discretely lowers the probability of employment for the discriminated group to such an extent that
the expected payoﬀ for the latter at these high wage ﬁrms does not meet the expected market payoﬀ. This
setup is supported by Lang and Lehmann (2012) and Heckman (1998), who mention that workers do not
apply randomly and they actually avoid prejudiced employers to some extent, which implies between-group
search externality is taken into account by the discriminated workers. Moreover, it is well known that within-
group search externality may be prevalent when wages are bargained; while in wage posting context, we are
able to abstract from search externality and focus on discrimination. Hall and Krueger (2010) use U.S.
data to show that fraction of posted and bargained wages are both around one third. They also document
a negative relationship between the education level and precise information concerning the expected pay.
Brenzel, Gartner and Shnabel (2013) focus on the employer's side of the study in Germany, and show that
around two thirds of the wages are posted, and the bargained wages are more likely set for those with higher
education and qualiﬁcation. The message is that not only is wage posting a prevalent wage determination
process in the labor market, more importantly, it is also dominant in the relatively low skilled sector.2
Within our context, employers can not post wages contingent on workers' group identity which is irrelevant
to productivity, which could be understood as due to the functioning of the equal opportunity legislation.
Literature addressing discrimination problem in random search context is vaster. However, to have
tractable such model convenient for linking to evidence, the introduced discrimination is usually taste-based,
hence to obtain realistic outcome may often require making compromise on assuming ex ante diﬀerences in
parameters governing relevant characteristics. Rosen (1997) is an exception and shows that discrimination
can result even if there are no diﬀerences across groups. Job opportunities arrive stochastically, minority
workers choose reservation productivities above which they accept the job; To avoid majority workers who are
always preferred, they choose to accept jobs even with low reservation wages. Although private information
is the key element in Rosen (1997)'s model, search externality remains the main channel for the functioning
of the discrimination mechanism. Our focus is on how the ranking order of ﬁrms contributes to strategic
interdependence in workers' skill investment decisions, and search externality is internalized when search is
directed.
There is also the important statistical discrimination literature3 which emphasizes the role of asymmetric
information on qualities related to the productivity. One strand of this literature derives group inequalities
2It is consistent with our knowledge that the more skilled workers, whose number is comparatively small, usually receive
more attention and protections.
3We refer readers to the survey from Fang & Moro (2010)
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endogenously even in the absence of ex ante group diﬀerence on relevant characteristics. Their mechanism
is that decision makers' asymmetric beliefs on relevant characteristics of members for diﬀerent groups could
subsequently dim unfavored agents' incentive on investment on payoﬀ-relevant technology, which in turn
justiﬁes the ﬁrms initial beliefs. Our context is diﬀerent from this literature mainly in the point that, instead
of relying on the information friction which plays central role in generating the pessimistic outcome, we work
through a sequential game where agents could correctly anticipate the pessimistic outcomes, hence choose
to react accordingly in a rational way.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the case without discrimination. We then move to
the economy with discrimination in Section 3. In section 4, we consider the case of wage bargaining. Section
5 discusses, and then we conclude.
2 The model without discrimination
We start with a context without hiring discrimination. Consider an economy populated by two kinds of
agents, the workers and the ﬁrms. The number of workers is N ,4 with the index i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, and the
number of ﬁrms is M , with the index j ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}. Deﬁne the market tightness as β ≡ NM .
We introduce a pre-matching investment stage in a standard wage posting game. Each job seeker makes
a skill investment decision before entering into the labor market. This skill choice is assumed to be binary,
such that if the worker decides to become highly skilled, an investment cost EH is paid, and otherwise EL,
with EH > EL. A highly skilled job seeker who pays EH is capable of producing yH ; while a low skilled could
only deliver yL. It would be useful to understand the formulation in the following way: workers who enter
labor market after a longer period of training at school expect to receive higher expected income compared
to those who spend a shorter period in schooling and enter the market at an earlier stage; the opportunity
cost for the former is EH , and for the latter is EL. We assume that workers' skill level is public information.
The costs {EL, EH} and productivities {yL, yH} are exogenous, but should satisfy some conditions which
will be speciﬁed later.
Firms are ex ante identical. Having observed the distribution of skill attainment of job seekers, they
post wages conditional on skills. If ﬁrms choose to attract a high skilled worker, they post wH , and the
surplus after matching is yH − wH ; in case a low-skilled worker is searched for, wL is announced and the
surplus is yL − wL. We emphasize that skill is a characteristic of workers which the wage contracts can be
conditioned on; this is in sharp contrast to other qualities such as gender, race, height etc. which, under
equal pay legislation, should not be conditioned on; so when ﬁrms distinguish workers according to these
latter qualities, the wage contract becomes incomplete;5 by this, we will say that ﬁrms discriminate.
The timing follows that of a standard wage posting game, augmented by a pre-matching skill investment
stage (Stage 0):
Stage 0: Workers choose skill level, and pay either EH or EL.
Stage 1: Firms observe skills of job seekers, and announce the wage (wL, wH).
4As noted by Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005), the number N could be regarded as the expected number of entrants (job
seekers) from the ﬁrms' perspective.
5Incompleteness of contract is the source of ineﬃciency for the holdup problem. See Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) for related
literature.
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Stage 2: Workers observe the wages oﬀers, and choose which wage to apply to.
Stage 3: Firms select workers from the received applications, and they select workers with same skill
levels with equal probability. Then the production is carried on, and payoﬀs are realized.
We will focus on subgame perfect equilibria. Firms choose wages to maximize proﬁts, and workers choose
ﬁrstly the skill level and then which wage to apply to, in order to maximize the expected payoﬀ from search.
2.1 Speciﬁcation of the Strategies, matching probabilities, and payoﬀ functions
To write agents' payoﬀs, it is a routine procedure in the directed search literature to ﬁrst derive the
matching functions. This section provides a quick summary for the general understanding of the context.
Deﬁne a type-t job seeker i's strategy as a vector of probabilities Θit =
(
θi1t , ..., θ
iM
t
)
, where θijt is the
probability with which the type-t worker i applies to ﬁrm j, and t ∈ {L,H}. It holds that ∑j θijt = 1 for
any i and t. As in the literature, it is convenient6 to proceed with a transformation of variable. We deﬁne
q, as expected number of applications received per ﬁrm; it is also called the expected queue length.
Denote qj as the queue length of ﬁrm j, and qjt as the queue length of the type-t workers in ﬁrm j. If a
ﬁrm attracts both high and low skilled, we have qj = qjL + q
j
H , where q
j
L and q
j
H are the queue length of the
corresponding workers in ﬁrm j. Since we only consider symmetric equilibria, for a given ﬁrm j, θijt has the
same value for any type t job seeker, so we denote θijL = θ
j
L and θ
ij
H = θ
j
H for any j. By deﬁnition, q
j
t is the
number of workers of type t in ﬁrm j times their application probability: qjH = NH × θjH , and qjL = NL× θjL
for any j, where NL and NH are the total number of low skilled and high skilled workers respectively.
Firms. A particular ﬁrm j matches with a worker if after the search stage at least one worker appears,
which happens with probability 1−
(
1− θjt
)Nt
. The probability that no job seeker sends application to this
ﬁrm is
(
1− θjt
)Nt
, and 1 −
(
1− θjt
)Nt
is the probability of receiving at least one application from type t
workers. According to the aboved deﬁned relationship qjt = Ntθ
j
t , the probability
(
1−
(
1− θjt
)Nt)
, goes
to
(
1− e−qjt
)
when Nt → ∞. This probability is increasing in q, which means that the more the expected
number of applicants, the higher the probability that the ﬁrm could ﬁll the vacancy. The ﬁrm chooses wage
to maximize their expected proﬁt, which is the product of the probability of meeting a worker of this type
and the net surplus,
(
1− e−qjt
)
×
(
yt − wjt
)
, where yt ∈ {H,L}. In the following we may occasionally
suppress the superscript j whenever it does not raise confusion.
As shown by Shi (2006), in case workers of both skill levels appear in the market, it is optimal for ﬁrms
to post both wL and wH to attract both skill types. Furthermore, ﬁrms rank the high skilled in priority to
the low skilled, that is, ﬁrms will only consider hiring the low skilled workers when they did not receive any
application from high skilled workers, an event which happens with probability e−qH . Then the expected
proﬁt (from attracting both types of workers) is
6When the number of ﬁrms and workers are large, it is no longer convenient to operate with the workers' application strategy
θji , because it will tend to zero in the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
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(1− e−qH )× (yH − wH) + e−qH (1− e−qL)× (yL − wL)
Job seekers. Job seekers observe all the wages w announced by ﬁrms, and choose which wage to
apply to. Consider a particular job seeker. Conditional on visiting a particular ﬁrm j, his probability of
employment in that ﬁrm is
1−(1−θjH)
NH
NHθ
j
H
if he is high skilled, and
(
1− θjH
)NH × 1−(1−θjL)NL
NLθ
j
L
if low skilled
(see Appendix for more details). And these probabilities become 1−e
−qj
H
qjH
and e−q
j
H
1−e−q
j
L
qjL
when N →∞ and
M → ∞. Notice that 1−e−qtqt is decreasing in qt: the higher the expected number of applicants in this ﬁrm
competing this job with him, the lower the probability with which this job seeker will be employed. Also
notice that the employment probability of the low skilled workers is a product of e−qH and 1−e
−qL
qL
, where
the former governs the between-group competition eﬀect, and 1−e
−qL
qL
governs the within-group competition
eﬀect.
We remark that since q is a function of job seekers' application strategy, it depends on w. We now look
more closely into their causal relationship. We should distinguish two terms: (1) each job seeker's expected
payoﬀ from application, and (2) her expected market payoﬀ. The expected payoﬀ from application is
the payoﬀ that a worker receives when applying to a certain ﬁrm, namely, a product of the wage and the
probability of obtaining it at that ﬁrm, namely, 1−e
−qH
qH
×wH for the high skilled, and e−qH 1−e−qLqL ×wL for
the low skilled. The expected market payoﬀ, denoted by Ut, is the maximum level of the expected payoﬀ
from application in the equilibrium. Ut is regarded as an aggregate variable, which is assumed to be invariant
with respect to any variation of an individual agent's strategy. Consider a particular type H job seeker. He
is willing to send application to a particular ﬁrm j, if and only if his expected payoﬀ 1−e
−qj
H
qjH
× wjH from
doing so is equal or greater than the expected market payoﬀ UH . By the deﬁnition that UH is the maximum
level attainable, we have
qjH

> 0 if 1−e
−qj
H
qjH
× wjH = UH
= 0 if 1−e
−qj
H
qjH
× wjH < UH
Job seekers make trade-oﬀ between the wage and the probability obtaining it. To highlight the dependence
of qt on wt, we could rewrite the above expressions as
qjH
{
> 0 if wjH > UH
= 0 if wjH ≤ UH
Indeed, the employment probability 1−e
−qH
qH
is a number which belongs to the interval (0, 1); if the wage
is too low such that wjH ≤ UH , it will attract no workers, qH is zero; if wjH > UH , there is always a positive
value qH which satisﬁes
1−e−q
j
H
qjH
× wjH = UH .
We now formalize the notion of equilibrium and will proceed in two steps. In the ﬁrst, we state the
notion of equilibrium for the wage posting subgame given a skill distribution of workers. In the second, we
distinguish two notions on how workers optimally choose their skill level. For the wage posting subgame, the
solution concept will be standard subgame-perfect competitive equilibrium (SPCE) similar to LMD (2005).
As emphasized by LMD (2005), it is 'a simpliﬁcation of standard subgame-perfection in which the aggregate
7
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variables are assumed constant with respect to the changes in the strategy of an individual agent.' Given
the fraction of α ∈ [0, 1] of high skilled workers, an equilibrium, symmetric among workers, consists of the
expected market payoﬀs (UH , UL), each ﬁrms' strategy (w
∗
H , w
∗
L), and workers' strategies (q
∗
H , q
∗
L), that
satisfy the following requirements: (i) each ﬁrm's posted wage (w∗H , w
∗
L) is a best response to the other
ﬁrms' strategy and to the workers' strategies (q∗H , q
∗
L), on the assumption that the market expected payoﬀ
(UH (w), UL (w))
7 remains ﬁxed at UH (w
∗) and UL (w∗), and is invariant to the ﬁrm's own wage; and (ii)
q∗t (w) with t ∈ {L,H} is a best response of each worker to any wage vector w, and to the choice of q∗t (w)
by all other workers.
Now we turn to workers' skill decision which determines the value of α. Workers choose to be high skilled
whenever UH −EH > UL−EL, then the fraction of high skilled workers is such that α = 1. Workers choose
to be low skilled whenever UH −EH < UL−EL, then the fraction of high skilled workers is such that α = 0.
Workers are indiﬀerent between high and low skill when UH −EH = UL−EL. In the case with indiﬀerence,
we should make distinctions on two notions speciﬁed as follows:
• Notion 1 (perfect correlation): Whenever indiﬀerent, all workers (within a group) choose either high
or low skilled.
• Notion 2 (no perfect correlation): Whenever indiﬀerent, α represents individual worker's probability
of choosing to be high skilled.
Under Notion 1, all workers in one group, whenever indiﬀerent between two alternatives (L or H), will
randomize towards the same direction: that is to say, we consider the group of workers as a whole, or there
is perfect correlation on their skill choices; as a result, α does not represent an individual's probability
of choosing high skilled and takes either the value 0 or 1, α ∈ {0, 1}. Under Notion 2, each worker can
randomize between high and low skill whenever they are indiﬀerent; since each worker can end up either
high or low skilled, after this randomization, high and low skilled workers can be present at the same time,
in contrast to Notion 1; The equilibrium value of α, denoted by α∗, will be endogenously determined by the
indiﬀerence equation, in which case α∗ ∈ (0, 1).
In the following analysis in this section without discrimination, we will derive equilibrium under both
notions because technically Notion 1 could be regarded as a subproblem of Notion 2. However, we will focus
exclusively on the study under Notion 1 when we turn to the section with discrimination. By doing so, we
are able to abstract from some equilibrium which only arises under theoretical rigor but at the same time
yields insights to a limited extent and induces unnecessary complexity in analysis.
Solution of the wage posting subgame. According to Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), the deﬁnition
of equilibrium is equivalent to a problem where ﬁrms choose wages to maximize their expected proﬁt, taking
into account the best responses of other ﬁrms as well as of the job seekers. As we consider a large economy,
in which a single ﬁrm's deviation does not alter the expected market payoﬀ Ut, the market payoﬀ can be
taken as given in the stage where a ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt, and will later be determined endogenously.
Thus, we consider the optimization problem in which a (deviating) ﬁrm j chooses wt with t ∈ {L,H} to
maximize its expected proﬁt, taking expected market payoﬀ Ut (other ﬁrms' responses) and the functional
relationship between wt and qt (job seekers' responses) as given. When the ﬁrm attracts a single skill type,
7w denotes the wage vector of all the ﬁrms.
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the equilibrium can be solved by8
maxwt (1− e−qt)× (yt − wt)
s.to 1−e
−qt
qt
× wt = Ut
for t ∈ {L,H}. For a given Ut, solving wt from the constraint, substituting it into the objective function,
and maximizing with respect to qt, we can obtain an optimal functional relationship between q
∗
t and Ut.
Using this obtained relationship, with the help of the constraint, we then achieve an optimal functional
relationship between w∗t and q
∗
t . And since in symmetric equilibrium all ﬁrms will post the same wages, so
that all workers will apply to each ﬁrm with equal probability, by deﬁnition of q we have qjH = q
∗
H =
N
M = β
and qjL = q
∗
L =
N
M = β, when either all workers are high skilled or all workers are low skilled. This program
is applicable under both Notion 1 and relevant situations of Notion 2. Under Notion 2, in addition, when
workers are indiﬀerent, both skills can be present at the same time, then ﬁrms attract both skill types as in
Shi (2006), the problem is
maxwH ,wL (1− e−qH )× (yH − wH) + e−qL (1− e−qH )× (yL − wL)
s.to 1−e
−qH
qH
× wH = UH
e−qH 1−e
−qL
qL
× wL = UL
Solving the program, we could obtain UH = e
−q∗H (yH − yL) + e−q∗H−q∗LyL, while UL = e−q∗H−q∗LyL; at the
equilibrium, we have q∗H =
NH
M , qL =
NL
M and q
∗
H +q
∗
L = β. At last, it is important to remark that qt depends
on wt continuously, as remarked by Shi (2002). In this way, a marginal change of wage wt can only lead to
a marginal modiﬁcation on the expected number of applicants qt. By the deﬁnition of q, under Notion 2,
we have q∗H (α) =
NH
M = αβ, and q
∗
L (α) =
NL
M = (1− α)β. Once the skill investment choice pins down the
value of α∗, we obtain q∗H = α
∗β, and q∗L = (1− α∗)β. In the next section, we establish the decentralized
market equilibrium and examine its properties. It is convenient to start with Notion 2.
2.2 Decentralized Market Equilibrium without discrimination under Notion 2
Firms' wage oﬀers are conditioned on job seekers' skill levels, so we ﬁrst consider the skill investment
decision of job seekers at ﬁrst stage. Denote α as the fraction of the job seekers who choose to invest in
high skill, so the remaining fraction (1− α) is low skilled. Under Notion 2, α is also the probability with
which a job seeker chooses to invest in high skill, by virtue of the Law of Large Number. Let α∗ denote the
equilibrium fraction of high skilled job seekers on the total population. There are three cases:
Case (1). α∗ = 1. All job seekers invest in high skill.
Case (2). α∗ ∈ (0, 1). Some invest in high skill, while the remaining in low skill.
Case (3). α∗ = 0. All invest in low skill.
With Case (1) and Case (3), there exists only one skill level in the market, and since skills can be
conditioned on wages, there is only one wage posted in equilibrium. However, the market with Case (2)
features two skill levels. Shi (2006) establishes that in this case it is optimal for ﬁrms to attract both skill
types, while ranking the high skilled in priority to the low skilled. We now show that the rivalry between the
8The program could also be understood as a deviating ﬁrm's proﬁt maximization, taking all the other ﬁrms' best response
as given. The other ﬁrms' best response is w∗t , which satisﬁes
1−e−q∗t
q∗t
w∗t = Ut.
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market competition (captured by market tightness β) and the magnitude of the return to skill ratio yH−yLEH−EL
are crucial in the determination of which of the above three cases may prevail.
Proposition 1. (return to skills) Given the return to skill ratio yH−yLEH−EL , deﬁne βˆ as
yH−yL
EH−EL = e
βˆ.
(i) when 0 < β ≤ βˆ, the unique equilibrium is such that all job seekers choose high skill, i.e. α∗ = 1.
(ii) when β > βˆ, the equilibrium consists of a unique value α∗ ∈ (0, 1) which satisﬁes yH−yLEH−EL = eα
∗β.
(iii) when yH−yLEH−EL ≤ 1 such that
yH−yL
EH−EL = e
βˆ has no positive solution on βˆ, the unique equilibrium is
α∗ = 0.
Proof. In the appendix.
When the value of return to skill yH−yLEH−EL is suﬃciently large compared to e
β , which measures the intensity
of competition of the market, job seekers ﬁnd it a dominant strategy to invest in high skills; There is no
incentive for them to deviate, and the output is highest among all the equilibria. When the value of yH−yLEH−EL
is moderate, there exists an equilibrium where job seekers are indiﬀerent from being high skilled or low skills;
all ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to attract both skill types; the output is lower compared to the previous equilibrium.
At last, when the value of return to skill is suﬃciently low, it does not provide them incentive to sink this
ﬁxed cost against the risky job search game they are going to play; the equilibrium level of output turns out
to be the lowest.
2.2.1 Decentralized Market Equilibrium without discrimination under Notion 1
Under Notion 1, there is only one skill type present in the market. When ﬁrms attract a single skill type,
they solve
maxwt (1− e−qt)× (yt − wt)
s.to 1−e
−qt
qt
× wt = Ut
In equilibrium, for the high skilled we have: UH = e
−q∗HyH , w∗H =
e−q
∗
H q∗H
1−e−q∗H yH , where q
∗
H = β; and for the
low skilled: UL = e
−q∗LyL, w∗L =
e−q
∗
Lq∗L
1−e−q∗L yL, where q
∗
L = β. So that we have
α =

1 when e−βyH − EH > e−βyL − EL
0 or 1 when e−βyH − EH = e−βyL − EL
0 when e−βyH − EH < e−βyL − EL
It turns out that the threshold which makes workers indiﬀerent is the same as βˆ established under Notion
2.
2.3 Constrained eﬃcient allocations
The objective of this section is to ﬁnd the eﬃcient allocations in the centralized market, and evaluate
whether the decentralized market attains its eﬃciency. The social planner maximizes the aggregate output,
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subject to the same matching friction as in the decentralized equilibrium. More precisely, the social planner
chooses the fraction of workers to be high-skilled, divides ﬁrms into diﬀerent groups to attract distinct
compositions of workers, and assigns workers to match with a certain group of ﬁrms. With the same
matching friction as before, the social planner is restricted to treat workers of the same skill level in the
same way, and assures that workers of the same skill type must match with ﬁrms from the same group with
the same probability.
We use the superscript p to label the equilibrium allocation chosen by the planner. Let α be the
fraction of high skilled workers the social planner chooses, α ∈ [0, 1]. If the optimal arrangement is αp = 1,
all job seekers are high skilled, and only one type of ﬁrms exists - those which attract high skilled workers.
It is similar for αp = 0. If αp ∈ (0, 1), there are both high and low skilled job seekers and it is optimal
for the planner to assign all ﬁrms to post wages for both the high and low skilled (shown in Shi (2006)).
Furthermore, in the last case the planner can also manage the priority of ﬁrms' hiring workers with diﬀerent
skills - whether to prefer high skilled to low skilled or otherwise. Let R be the probability with which the
ﬁrms rank high skilled workers in priority to the low skilled. And qt is the expected number of applicants in
a ﬁrm, t ∈ {L,H}, which governs how the planner assigns workers' applications. Thus, the social planner's
problem is to maximize the following aggregate output
M ×
[
(1− e−qH ) (R× (1− e−qL) + e−qL) yH
+ (1− e−qL) ((1−R) (1− e−qH ) + e−qH ) yL
]
−N × (αEH + (1− α)EL)
If at least one high skilled visits a certain ﬁrm, with probability (1− e−qH ), the ﬁrm hires this high
skilled, either with probability 1 when no low skilled worker shows up, which happens with probability e−qL ,
or with probability R if there is at least one low skilled who shows up at the same ﬁrm, which occurs with
probability (1− e−qL); it is similar for the case with low productivity. Since the ﬁrms and workers of the
same skill are all identical from the planner's perspective, we have qH = αβ and qL = (1− α)β. The above
objective includes all cases with diﬀerent values of α. Solving the problem, we can see that the optimal
ranking is that ﬁrms always prefer high skilled workers, i.e., Rp = 1, and we have the following proposition
Proposition 2. The equilibrium labor allocation and skill investment choice are socially optimal.
Proof. In the Appendix.
In the proof, we could also verify that the threshold βˆp for skill investment coincides with βˆ in the
decentralized economy. That is, when 0 < β ≤ βˆ = log yH−yLEH−EL , it is socially optimal that workers all invest
in high skill; when β > βˆ, it is socially optimal that a fraction α∗ of workers invest in high, while the rest
invest in low skill; and yH−yLEH−EL ≤ 1 such that βˆ has no positive real solution, all invest in low skill. In the
rest of the paper, we mainly focus on the ﬁrst case, so that whenever workers are discouraged to underinvest,
it is due to the eﬀect of discrimination.
3 The model with hiring discrimination
We now introduce discrimination. Consider an economy where workers can be partitioned into two groups,
group a and group b, according to certain trait which is irrelevant to productivity. Gender, for example, is
such one possible binary partition of labor force. Denote the fraction of group a as γ, and the fraction of
11
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group b as 1−γ. The two group of workers are ex ante identical in all other aspects. Discrimination modiﬁes
the matching functions of agents. Speciﬁcally, in order to formulate discrimination, we introduce a term x
called hiring (ranking) rule speciﬁed by ﬁrms. To be precise, x could be understood as the probability with
which the group a workers are selected when workers from both groups are present. The probability that a
group a worker is employed by this ﬁrm is
Fa (qa, qb, x) =
1− e−qa
qa
× [x (1− e−qb)+ e−qb]
Analogously, the probability that a group b worker is employed by this ﬁrm is
Fb (qa, qb, x) =
1− e−qb
qb
× [(1− x) (1− e−qa)+ e−qa]
To understand these expressions, we have to notice that now when job seekers are considering their
probability of being hired, they have to take into account of the impact from the competition with the other
group. The parts 1−e
−qa
qa
and 1−e
−qb
qb
capture the within group competition, while the remaining parts with
x capture the between group competition.
When x = 1, ﬁrms hire group b workers only when none of the group a is present. Firms' preference
is such that group a are preferred to group b, although both groups have identical productivity. This is
what we call hiring discrimination. The employment probability for group a and group b workers become
respectively,
Fa (qa, qb, 1) =
1−e−qa
qa
Fb (qa, qb, 1) =
1−e−qb
qb
× [e−qa ]
Another interesting example is x = 12 . The employment probability for group a and group b workers
becomes respectively
Fa
(
qa, qb,
1
2
)
=
1− e−qa
qa
×
[
1
2
× (1− e−qb)+ e−qb]
Fb
(
qa, qb,
1
2
)
=
1− e−qb
qb
×
[
1
2
× (1− e−qa)+ e−qa]
When qa = qb, we have Fa
(
qa, qb,
1
2
)
= Fb
(
qa, qb,
1
2
)
, both workers have identical employment probability,
and it is as if there is no discrimination among workers. Furthermore, we have Fa (qa, qb, 1) ≥ Fa
(
qa, qb,
1
2
)
for
any positive value of (qa, qb). Then the employment probability of workers from the preferred group (group a)
is higher under discrimination than that in the case without discrimination. Similarly, when Fb (qa, qb, 1) ≤
Fb
(
qa, qb,
1
2
)
for any positive values of (qa, qb), i.e. the employment probability of the discriminated group
(group b) is lower when there is hiring discrimination. In fact, the employment probability of group a (group
b) is increasing (decreasing) in x.Thus, for a given positive pair of (qa, qb), there exists xˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that
Fa (qa, qb, xˆ) = Fb (qa, qb, xˆ), and xˆ could be considered as the hiring rule without discrimination. Indeed x
measures the intensity of ﬁrms' discriminatory preference. Given qa and qb, for x ∈ [0, xˆ), ﬁrms discriminate
group a, and for x ∈ (xˆ, 1] ﬁrms discriminate against group b. The closer x approaches to the extremes of
the interval [0, 1], the more intensive the hiring discrimination is. In the rest of paper, we focus on the case
x = 1 such that group a achieve absolute priority to group b.
12
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3.1 The case of strong discrimination: x = 1
Formally, we introduce two assumptions as in Merlino (2012). These assumptions help introduce some
heterogeneity which is not related to productivity among the labor pool.
Assumption 1: Firms are not allowed to post wages which are dependent on the group identity.
Assumption 2: Firms prefer group a in the sense that ﬁrms only hire workers from group b when no
group a workers are present, i.e. x = 1.
Same as the case without discrimination, workers visit a ﬁrm only when they can obtain the expect
market payoﬀ from applying to that ﬁrm. We denote in this section the expected market payoﬀ of high
skilled job seekers from group a and group b as UaH and UbH respectively. The above assumptions imply
UaH = FaH (qaH , qbH)× wH = 1−e−qaHqaH × wH
UbH = FbH (qaH , qbH)× wH = 1−e−qbHqbH e−qaH × wH
For β ≤ βˆ, all workers choose to be high-skilled if there were no discrimination. To analyze how does
discrimination have impact on workers' expected payoﬀ from search hence the skill investment incentives, it
is important to ﬁrst study the wage posting subgame with discrimination given a skill distribution. Without
loss of generality, we start with the case where both groups choose to be high skilled. In the next section,
we review the results from LMD (2005), where they study the case with discrimination but no diﬀerence in
workers' skill levels (or productivity).
3.2 Existing results revisited and reinterpreted
In a context where there are two groups of workers with identical productivity (skill level) and ﬁrms
strongly prefer group a to group b. LMD (2005) show that any subgame-perfect competitive equilibrium
(SPCE) is separating.
Separating equilibrium. LMD (2005) show that there is no wage to which both groups of job seekers
apply. More precisely, no wage can maximize ﬁrms' proﬁt while attracting both groups of workers simultane-
ously (with the expected payoﬀ from application attaining the corresponding market payoﬀ). The equilibrium
is separating. That is, there are some ﬁrms posting a higher level of wage attracting only the preferred group
a, whereas the rest of ﬁrms oﬀering a lower wage which is applied only by the discriminated group b (see
Proposition 2 in LMD (2005)). Notice that the discriminated group have always the choice of applying to
the high wage ﬁrms, however, they choose not to do so at all, because they anticipate discrimination in these
ﬁrms. The most essential results of LMD (2005) are summarized as follows:
(i) At the ﬁrms attracting group a workers, expected proﬁt for the ﬁrms and the expected payoﬀ for the
workers in the equilibrium are
piSaH =
(
1− e−qSaH − qSaHe−q
S
aH
)
× yH
USaH = e
−qSaH × yH
wSaH =
qSaHe
−qSaH
1−e−qSaH
× yH
13
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ii) At the ﬁrms attracting group b workers, expected proﬁt for the ﬁrms and the expected payoﬀ for the
workers in the equilibrium are
piSbH =
(
1− e−qSbH
)(
1− e−qSaH
)
× yH ,
wSbH = U
S
aH
USbH =
1−e−qSbH
qSbH
wSbH
Separating equilibrium requires that ﬁrms be indiﬀerent between attracting group a and group b workers,
that is
piSaH = pi
S
bH
which helps to determine qSbH and q
S
aH jointly.
(iii) Furthermore, we have wSaH > w
S
bH . q
S
aH > β > q
S
bH , both q
S
aH and q
S
bH are increasing in β and γ,
and both qSaH and q
S
bH are independent of yH .
We make some important remarks on the features of the separating equilibrium. Firstly, the resulted
equilibrium allocations are incentive compatible. For any particular bH job seeker, by deviating to applying
for wSaH , the best they can get is e
−qSaH × wSaH (when none of the group a shows up in the ﬁrm which this
bH worker deviates to apply to). However, this deviating payoﬀ is strictly lower than sticking to applying
to wSbH owing to the following relationship:
e−q
S
aH × wSaH = e−q
S
aH × qSa×e−q
S
a
1−e−qSa × yH =
qSa×e−q
S
a
1−e−qSa × U
S
aH
= e−q
S
bHUSaH = e
−qSbHwSbH <
1−e−qSbH
qSbH
wSbH = U
S
bH
. As for any particular aH job seeker, by deviating to wSbH , the best they can get is w
S
bH = U
S
aH , which is as
good as what he could get if he does not deviate. Secondly, we do not have the reservation wage structure.
A reservation wage structure requires that workers apply to any wage which gives them an expected payoﬀ
higher than certain reservation value, in our case it would imply group bH should apply to both the low and
high wages, however, it is not the case. This is because the expected payoﬀ from applying to the high wage
is a strictly dominated strategy for group b: the expected payoﬀ from applying to high wages is too low to
match their expected market payoﬀ USbH . Following are several noteworthy properties of such an equilibrium.
Results from LMD (2005): Compared to the context without discrimination, (1) Both groups have
lower expected payoﬀ. (2) All ﬁrms earn higher proﬁts. (3) The expected payoﬀ of group a and group b are
such that USaH > U
S
bH .
Group b workers are worse oﬀ, because of ﬁrms' discriminatory hiring norm. Anticipating discrimination,
group b demand lower expected payoﬀ, which makes them cheaper to be employed. This in turn increases
ﬁrms' market power in hiring group a. Group a understand that if they demand high wages, ﬁrms will
threat to switch to hiring group b workers instead. Hence group a workers demand also low wages, and
are worse oﬀ too. Now more about ﬁrms. Apart from the mechanisms just described, ﬁrms are able to
earn high proﬁts because in the regime with discrimination market is segmented, which allows the ﬁrms to
face less competition in each segment. As a general remark, discrimination enables ﬁrms to extract higher
proﬁt by holding up job seekers' skill investment and providing all the job seekers lower expected payoﬀ.
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Furthermore, since USaH > U
S
bH , it suggests that the group b job seekers, being discriminated, are hurt to a
larger extent. So that group b' incentive of skill investment is distorted further downwards. We enter more
detailed discussions in the following section.
3.3 Analysis under our context
In the last section, we interpreted the equilibrium of the wage posting subgame given that all workers
choose to be high skilled. In this section, we study how discrimination leads to diﬀerent incentives of skill
investment for these two groups respectively, and attempt to ﬁnd the corresponding equilibrium.
An important observation is that the skill decision for group a and group b is strategic, and this is a
direct consequence of the coexistence of ranking through the productivity-dependent (skill) and -independent
traits (discrimination). Ranking by skills requires that the high skilled workers have the priority; While
ranking by productivity-independent traits means that group a have the priority. Although multidimensional
characteristics are involved, these two ranking schedules yield a unique market hierarchy:
aH  bH  aL  bL
. It reads as follows: high skilled group a (aH) are preferred to high skilled group b (bH), who are preferred
to low skilled group a (aL), who are then preferred to low skilled group b (bL). How does the strategic
interdependence arise? Take group a as an example for explanation. Although they are always ranked prior
to group b due to discrimination, whenever they contemplate to lower skill investment, they understand that
they will be ranked behind the high skilled group b; then the term e−qbH which captures the competition
from bH will appear in their payoﬀs.
Given the strategic interdependence in payoﬀs from skill investment, we adopt Nash equilibrium as the
solution concept for the skill investment game. We proceed under Notion 1, and regard a whole group as
making decision collectively and simultaneously, then all the workers in one group either end up high or low
skilled. And we will focus on pure strategy of each group. Let αg be the probability of group g's choosing
to be high skilled, for g = a or b. We have either αg = 1 or αg = 0. We have the following four possibilities
as equilibrium:
• (P1) αa = 1 and αb = 1: group a - high, group b - high
• (P2) αa = 1 and αb = 0: group a - high, group b - low
• (P3) αa = 0 and αb = 1: group a - low, group b - high
• (P4) αa = 0 and αb = 0: group a - low, group b - low
To decide the skill investment, workers take into account ﬁrms' best response in the wage posting stage to
infer the expected payoﬀ from application, and compare the payoﬀs net of the cost of skill investment. In
the wage posting subgame, when facing all workers with identical skill level (as in case (P1) and (P4)), ﬁrms'
optimal strategy is the same as stated in LMD (2005); that is, some ﬁrms post a higher wage which is only
applied by group a, whereas the rest post a lower wage which is only applied by group b. When there are
both low and high skilled workers (as in case (P2) and (P3)), ﬁrms post wages conditional on skill level,
and it is optimal for ﬁrms to attract both skill levels and rank the high skilled in priority to low skilled,
as in Shi (2006). We then proceed to ﬁnd workers' best response in the skill investment stage, and in turn
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the equilibrium in this discriminatory context with skill investment. We will use P1, P2, P3, P4 as the
superscript for corresponding equilibrium allocations. When αa = 1 and αb = 1, workers are composed of
type aH and bH. Firms post wages separately. We have the following payoﬀs for aH and bH respectively,
UP1aH = e
−qP1aHyH − EH
and
UP1bH =
1−e−qP1bH
qP1bH
e−q
P1
aHyH − EH
where we recall that qSaH = q
P1
bH < β < q
P1
aH = q
S
bH .
When αa = 1 and αb = 0, workers are composed of type aH and bL. Firms post wages conditional on
skills, attract both types at the same time, and rank the high skilled in priority to the low skilled. As for
the payoﬀs, we have
UP2aH = e
−qP2aH (yH − yL) + e−qP2aH−qP2bL yL − EH
and
UP2bL = e
−qP2aH−qP2bL yL − EL
where qP2aH = γβ, q
P2
bL = (1− γ)β, and qP2aH + qP2bL = β.
When αa = 0 and αb = 1, workers are composed of diﬀerent skill levels, aL and bH, we have similarly
UP3aL = e
−qP3aL−qP3bHyL − EL
and
UP3bH = e
−qP3bH (yH − yL) + e−qP3aL−qP3bHyL − EH
where qP3aL = γβ, q
P3
bH = (1− γ)β, and qP3aL + qP3bH = β.
When αa = 0 and αb = 0, workers are composed of type aL and bL. Both are of same skill level, ﬁrms
will discriminate and post wages as in LMD (2005), and workers' payoﬀs are
UP4aL = e
−qP4aLyL − EH
and
UP4bL =
1−e−qP4bL
qP4bL
e−q
P4
aLyL − EL
Since the solution of q in LMD (2005) is independent of yH and yL, we have q
P1
bH = q
P4
bL < β < q
P4
aL = q
P1
bH .
The payoﬀ matrix is as follows
bH bL
aH
bH:
1−e−q
P1
bH
qP1
bH
e−q
P1
aH yH − EH
aH: e−q
P1
aH yH − EH
bL: e−q
P2
aH−q
P2
bL yL − EL
aH: e−q
P2
aH (yH − yL) + e−q
P2
aH−q
P2
bL yL − EH
aL
bH: e−q
P3
bH (yH − yL) + e−q
P3
aL−q
P3
bH yL − EH
aL: e−q
P3
aL−q
P3
bH yL − EL
bL:
1−e−q
P4
bL
qP4
bL
e−q
P4
aLyL − EL
aL: e−q
P4
aLyL − EH
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A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium on skill investment consists of a proﬁle of actions with the property
that no single group as a whole can achieve a higher payoﬀ by unilateral deviation. The equilibrium depends
on the value of β. For example, holding group a high skilled, when we decide whether group b choose to be
high or low skill, we must compare UP1bH and U
P2
bL . And we ﬁnd that there exists at least one threshold βˆ2
which is determined by UP1bH = U
P2
bL and is such that βˆ2 < βˆ; this implies that depending on diﬀerent values
of β, the group b may choose high or low skill, leading to potentially diﬀerent equilibrium. For tractability,
we should introduce the following two conditions which guarantee that any such threshold as βˆ2 is unique:
9
Assumption 3.1 The equality e−q
P1
aH(βˆ1)yH − EH = e−βˆ1yL − EL admits a unique solution βˆ1.
Assumption 3.2 The equality 1−e
−qP1bH(βˆ2)
qP1bH(βˆ2)
e−q
P1
aH(βˆ2)yH −EH = e−βˆ2yL −EL admits a unique solution βˆ2.
The results on the equilibrium are summarized as follows:
Proposition 3: Under the above assumptions, there exist two thresholds βˆ2 and βˆ1 with 0 < βˆ2 < βˆ1 < βˆ,
such that
(1) When 0 < β < βˆ2, there exists a unique equilibrium in which both group a and group b invest in high
skill, (aH, bH). At β = βˆ2, both (aH, bH) and (aH, bL) can be equilibrium.
(2) When βˆ2 < β < βˆ1, there exists a unique equilibrium in which group a invest in high skill while group
b in low skill, (aH, bL). At β = βˆ1, both (aL, bH) and (aH, bL) can be equilibrium.
(3) When βˆ1 < β ≤ βˆ, there exist multiple equilibria. Either group a invest in high skill and group b in
low skill, or group a invest in low skill and group b invest in high skill, (aL, bH) or (aH, bL).
Proof. In the Appendix.
In fact, if one group choose to be low skilled, the best response of the other group is always to be high
skilled, while the best response to the other's high skill choice depends on the two thresholds. Furthermore,
the rise of market tightness β makes workers have stronger incentive to deviate from high skill, and group b
is more prone to deviate compared to group a, in the sense that the threshold of β at which group b begins
to contemplate to invest in low skill is lower compared to group a. Interestingly, for values of β close to
βˆ, there exists an equilibrium where the preferred group a choose low skill, while the discriminated group
b choose high skill. We have the following results on the comparison of workers' expected payoﬀ and ﬁrms'
proﬁts compared to the case without discrimination.
Corollary. Compared to the case without discrimination,
(1) In (aH, bH) equilibrium, ﬁrms always earn higher expected proﬁts; In (aH, bL) equilibrium and
(aL, bH), ﬁrms earn lower expected proﬁts.
(2) In (aH, bH) equilibrium, both aH and bH workers earn lower expected payoﬀ; In (aH, bL) equilibrium,
group aH (group bL) earn higher (lower) expected payoﬀ; in (aL, bH) equilibrium, group bH (group aL) earn
higher (lower) expected payoﬀ.
Proof. In the Appendix.
This corollary tells that ﬁrms can be worse oﬀ with discrimination. Indeed, when workers anticipate
discrimination, their investment incentive may be downwards distorted, and some group may end up choosing
to underinvest. In equilibrium, whenever one group underinvest and the other group remain high skilled, the
9When yH is suﬃciently large compared to yL, these two conditions are satisﬁed. Take βˆ1 for example. The related
assumption is satisﬁed when
e
−qP1aH (β) dq
P1
aH
dβ
e−β <
yH
yL
. Since qP1aH does not depend on yH and yL, there exists always a pair of yL
and yH such that this condition is satisﬁed.
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ﬁrms turn out to earn lower expected proﬁts compared to the case without discrimination. This is simply
due to the fact that underinvestment in skills discretely drags down the average productivity of the economy.
4 Comparison with ﬁxed sharing rule (Wage Bargaining)
In this section, we shut down the channel through which ﬁrms use wages to inﬂuence workers' choices on
applications, and examine whether the ineﬃciency can be alleviated. Notice that in this section, the workers
only choose the amount of skills to obtain, not where to search.
Consider an economy with the same discriminatory ranking as previous, but the wage is determined by
ex post bargaining after a job seeker meets an employer. The timing of the economy now is as follows:
ﬁrstly, workers decide skill levels simultaneously; secondly, workers and ﬁrms get matched according to the
matching technology; thirdly, the matched worker-ﬁrm pair bargain à la Nash to determine how to share the
output y. The simplest form of Nash bargaining widely used in literature is equivalent to a ﬁxed sharing rule
of output. If we denote the bargaining power for all workers as ψ, then from the output yt, workers receive
ψyt, and ﬁrms receive (1− ψ) yt. We focus on the case where ψ is the same for both skill levels, otherwise
there is too much degree of freedom.
For the ease of comparison, we require that the matching technology here is the same as in previous
section. The hiring norm is as previous Group aH  Group bH  Group aL  Group bL. The correspond-
ing employment probability for diﬀerent types of workers is inherited, so that the employment probability is
respectively 1−e
−qaH
qaH
for aH, e−qaH 1−e
−qbH
qbH
for bH, e−qaH−qbH 1−e
−qaL
qaL
for aL, and e−qaH−qbH−qaL 1−e
−qbL
qbL
for
bH. The expected payoﬀ (after skill investment) is just the employment probability times ψyt; for example,
we have for aL people e−qaH−qbH 1−e
−qaL
qaL
× ψyL as the expected payoﬀ from search.
Now, we specify the expected queue lengths qaH , qbH , qaL and qbL parametrically. Recall the deﬁnition
of queue length is nb. of workersnb. of vacancies , then we have qaH = γηaβ for aH workers, qbH = (1− γ) ηbβ for bH
workers, qaL = γ (1− ηa)β for aL workers, and qbL = (1− γ) (1− ηb)β for bL workers, where ηa represents
the fraction of high skilled group a, and ηb the fraction of high skilled group b. The values of ηa and ηb
depend on the comparison between the expected payoﬀ from investing in high or low skill:
ηa

= 1 if 1−e
−qaH
qaH
× ψyH − EH > e−qaH−qbH 1−e−qaLqaL × ψyL − EL
= 0 if 1−e
−qaH
qaH
× ψyH − EH < e−qaH−qbH 1−e−qaLqaL × ψyL − EL
∈ {0, 1} if 1−e−qaHqaH × ψyH − EH = e−qaH−qbH 1−e
−qaL
qaL
× ψyL − EL
and
ηb

= 1 if e−qaH 1−e
−qbH
qbH
× ψyH − EH > e−qaH−qbH−qaL 1−e−qbLqbL × ψyL − EL
= 0 if e−qaH 1−e
−qbH
qbH
× ψyH − EH < e−qaH−qbH−qaL 1−e−qbLqbL × ψyL − EL
∈ {0, 1} if e−qaH 1−e−qbHqbH × ψyH − EH = e−qaH−qbH−qaL 1−e
−qbL
qbL
× ψyL − EL
To keep consistency with the previous section (under Notion 1), we require that whenever indiﬀerent, the
whole group will choose either high or low skill, so that η is either 0 or 1 in that case. We will also assume
that the group a are the majority: γ ≥ 12 .10
10We think this case with γ ≥ 1
2
is more empirically relevant, when we are talking about gender and racial discrimination for
example. The case γ < 1
2
could be also analogously derived according to the proof of the following proposition.
18
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.02
We focus on Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. In the current context, only workers make
skill investment decisions, ﬁrms do not post wages since ψ is exogenous. We consider each group, i.e.
group a or group b, as a whole when they are making decisions. Each group of workers invest in skills
simultaneously. Due to the discriminatory rule, the payoﬀs from skill investment for diﬀerent groups of
workers are interdependent. This renders the skill investment strategic. The following proposition helps
explain how workers' expected payoﬀs vary with respect to ψ:
Proposition 4. Let γ ≥ 12 so that group a is the majority. There are four thresholds ψˆaL,b ≤ ψˆbH,a <
ψˆbL,a < ψˆaH,b, such that
(1) For ψ ∈
[
0, ψˆaL,b
)
, the unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is (aL, bL); for ψ = ψˆaL,b, the equilib-
rium can be (aL, bL) or (aL, bH). (2) For ψ ∈
(
ψˆaL,b, ψˆbH,a
)
, the unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is
(aL, bH); (3) For ψ ∈
(
ψˆbH,a, ψˆbL,a
)
, there is no pure strategy nash equilibrium; for ψ = ψˆbL,a, the equi-
librium is (aH, bL); (4) For ψ ∈
(
ψˆbL,a, ψˆaH,b
)
, the unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is (aH, bL); at
the point ψ = ψˆaH,b, the equilibrium can be (aH, bL) or (aH, bH). (5) For ψ ∈
(
ψˆaH,b, 1
)
, the unique pure
strategy nash equilibrium is (aH, bH). (6) Deﬁne the threshold ψˆ of skill investment without discrimination
as ψˆyH
1−e−β
β − EH = ψˆyL 1−e
−β
β − EL; then ψˆbL,a < ψˆ < ψˆaH,b.
Proof. In the Appendix.
It is not always true that the group a workers are always better oﬀ. Notably, there is an equilibrium
similar as before where group a underinvest: It could be observed from the payoﬀ matrix (provided in the
proof of Proposition 4) that in the region ψ ∈
(
ψˆaL,b, ψˆbH,a
)
group a (group b) workers obtain lower (higher)
expected payoﬀ compared to the case without discrimination. This is also closely related to the fact that
when γ ≥ 12 the within-group competition in group a is ﬁercer. In general, ﬁrms' payoﬀ is written as follows:
pi =

(1− e−qaH−qbH ) (1− ψ) yH if all high skilled
(1− e−qaH−qbH ) (1− ψ) yH
+e−qaH−qbH (1− e−qaL−qbL) (1− ψ) yL
if both high and low skilled
(1− e−qaL−qbL) (1− ψ) yL if all low skilled
According to Proposition 4, we can determine the exact values of the queue lengths in the expression.
Firms' proﬁt will be piecewise monotone because although ψ increases continuously, the skill composition
hence the average productivity of the market improves discretely with respect to this bargaining power. The
fact that ψˆbL,a < ψˆ < ψˆaH,b suggests that although ﬁrms can gather higher proﬁts for ψ < ψˆ, they encounter
loss for ψ ≥ ψˆ compared to the case without discrimination. The reason is that strategic competition
between the group a and group b deters the discriminated group's skill investment decision (in the sense
that group b may still choose to be low skilled when ψ is suﬃciently high), which pulls down the market's
average productivity and makes ﬁrms' expected proﬁt dim.
It is interesting to notice that our simple result that discrimination is costly for ﬁrms at high skilled
sector (when wages are bargained) questions the plausibility of key assumption of Merlino (2012) that
there is more discrimination in the high technology sector. Although Merlino (2012) mentioned bunches
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of empirical evidence in support of this assumption11, our simple result suggest that ﬁrms are simply better
oﬀ not discriminating when wages are principally bargained, since the loss in proﬁt from discriminating in
the high skilled sector may surpass the gain from discriminating in the low skilled sector. All in all, the
key diﬀerence between wage posting and wage bargaining is that the ex post wage now exogenously pegs on
the productivity, and ﬁrms can no longer manipulate their market power by translating their discriminatory
preference into constantly lower wages.
5 Discussion
Free entry. LMD (2005) have shown that their economy under discrimination with workers' identical
in productivity can be generalized to take into account ﬁrms' free entry. Speciﬁcally, we consider a stage
where ﬁrms sink capital after observing workers' skills. Each ﬁrm has diﬀerent capital cost with C1 < C2 <
... < CM < yL. Then ﬁrms which earn expected non-positive proﬁts after the reduction of capital cost would
simply not enter into the market. In the paper, we observe that the equilibrium is unique with respect to
β, which has a one-one relationship with M - the number of ﬁrms in the market, so that the results in the
paper could carry through with free entry. All ﬁrms in the market expect positive net proﬁts. When there
are diﬀerent skill groups, this result could also carry through, because the equilibrium proﬁt of ﬁrms is still
an increasing function of β.
Heterogeneity in skill investment cost. Some preliminary attempts from us suggest that our context
could be generalized to a situation where workers are heterogenous in their skill investment cost (although
more complicated): let the low skill investment cost be zero (EL = 0) for all workers, and the high skill
investment cost be, for simplicity, of two values EH,1 < EH,2; there are still two levels of productivity: yL
and yH . Focus on the corresponding βˆ and deﬁne it as βˆ = log
yH−yL
EH,2−EL . If the contracts can be contingent
on EH,1 and EH,2, the submarkets for type EH,1 workers and type EH,2 workers are separated, and all the
results in the paper carry through for the workers of cost EH,2; as for the workers of cost EH,1, their skill
investment cost is lower, hence they have stronger incentive to remain high skilled; then for values of β
close to βˆ = log yH−yLEH,2−EL , some equilibrium which exists in the EH,2 submarket may not exist in the EH,1
submarket. If the contracts can not be contingent on EH,1 and EH,2, both type EH,1 and type EH,2 are in
the same market and will compete; as a result, there may exist a region of β where both high skilled group
a and group b, as well as both low skilled group a and group b, exist at the same time. The extent of the
skill investment game is in turn larger, because, for example, a particular group a,EH,1 's skill investment
decision should be a best response of other groups: a,EH,2, b, EH,1, and b, EH,2. If heterogeneity in
skill investment cost is managed, it is possible to extend the model to multiple skill levels. Shi (2006) shows
that in such a model with multiple skill levels free of discrimination, the result that ﬁrms always rank the
high skilled workers in priority to the workers with lower skills can be generalized. The diﬃculty under the
context with discrimination, as just stated, is on the extent of the game.
6 Conclusion
11See Merlino (2012) page 4 for more relevant reference.
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In this paper, we study a holdup problem where ﬁrms can use discriminatory hiring norms to extract
higher than socially optimal proﬁts. We ﬁnd that when ﬁrms rank workers according to both productivity-
dependent and productivity-independent characteristics, skill investment becomes strategic between the dis-
criminated and the favored group. In case wages are posted, we suggest that depending on the market
tightness there may be equilibrium or multiple equilibria on skill investment; in some equilibrium the dis-
criminated group can obtain higher expected payoﬀ compared to the case without discrimination12 and ﬁrms
can be worse oﬀ. We also consider ﬁxed sharing rule (bargained wage) and make a comparison. Similar equi-
librium, where favored group underinvest while the discriminated group remain high skilled, exists; however,
the discriminated group are in general worse oﬀ compared to the case without discrimination in the sense
that they may still choose to underinvest when ψ is suﬃciently high. Firms' proﬁts are piecewise monotone
because the skill composition hence the average productivity of the market improves discretely with respect
to the bargaining power, and proﬁt loss may be incurred with discrimination within an intermediate range
of bargaining power.
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Appendix
A1. Derivation of matching probabilities.
We now derive a job seeker's matching probability and expected payoﬀ.
Job seekers. Having observed all the wage w =
{
w1, w2, ..., wM
}
announced by the ﬁrms, job seekers
choose which ﬁrm (or wage) to visit (or to apply for). Consider a particular job seeker i's problem, where
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. This job seeker thinks in the following way: Suppose I visit ﬁrm j, then conditional on the
fact that my application is sent to j, what is the probability that I could be employed? It depends upon the
number of the other job seekers who also send their job application to the same ﬁrm competing with me on
this job in ﬁrm j. This number (of the other job seekers) is a random variable which has a realisation from
the set {0, 1, ..., N − 1} and has a Binomial distribution. To see why it is the case, we use k to represent
the realized number of competitors. If k = 0, which happens with probability
(
1− θj)N−1, then the job
seeker i will be chosen by the ﬁrm with probability 1, because this job seeker is the only candidate. If k = 1,
which happens with probability (N − 1)× (θj)1 (1− θj)(N−1)−1, this job seeker i will be chosen by the ﬁrm
with probability 12 , because now the ﬁrm receives two applications, hence has two candidates, among whom
i is one. Generalising, if k = kˆ, which happens with probability C kˆN−1 ×
(
θj
)kˆ (
1− θj)N−1−kˆ, then this job
seeker i will be chosen with probability 1
kˆ+1
, because the ﬁrm j has kˆ + 1 candidates at disposal.
The employment probability for the workers is
∑N−1
k=0 C
k
N−1
(
θj
)k (
1− θj)N−1−k 1k+1 . This expression
could be simpliﬁed to
1−(1−θj)N
Nθj
13. Hence the job seeker's expected pay oﬀ is
1−(1−θj)N
Nθj × wj .
A2. Proofs of propositions
Proposition 1. (return to skills) Given the return to skill ratio yH−yLEH−EL , deﬁne βˆ as
yH−yL
EH−EL = e
βˆ.
(i) when 0 < β ≤ βˆ, the unique equilibrium is such that all job seekers choose high skill, i.e. α∗ = 1.
(ii) when β > βˆ, the equilibrium consists of a unique value α∗ ∈ (0, 1) which satisﬁes yH−yLEH−EL = eα
∗β.
(iii) when yH−yLEH−EL ≤ 1 such that
yH−yL
EH−EL = e
βˆ has no positive solution on βˆ, the unique equilibrium is
α∗ = 0.
Proof. We will prove only case (i) while the proof of case (ii) and (iii) are highly similar. Notice ﬁrst
that yH−yLEH−EL ≥ eβ is equivalent to e−βyH − EH ≥ e−βyL − EL.
We prove ﬁrstly that the deviation to low skill is not optimal. By this, we prove that a proportion  of
workers' deviating to low skill is suboptimal. And it suﬃces to show that after deviation, the deviator can
not get higher expected payoﬀ. Before deviation, the expected payoﬀ is e−q
∗
HyH −EH , where q∗H = β. After
deviation, the expected payoﬀ becomes e−q
D
H−qDL yL−EL, where qDH + qDL = β. However, under the condition
e−βyH − EH ≥ e−βyL − EL, the expected payoﬀ after deviation is weakly lower.
For the uniqueness. We should furthermore show that for the case of α = 0 and α ∈ (0, 1), there will be
proﬁtable deviation. When α = 0, the expected payoﬀ from search is e−βyL − EL. If there is a fraction 
deviating to high skill, then the expected income for the deviator becomes e−β (yH − yL) + e−βyL − EH .
13One way of deriving it could be seen in Melanie Cao & Shouyong Shi, 2000. "Coordination, matching, and wages". It could
also be checked by change of variable.
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Then this expected payoﬀ after deviation is greater than the expected payoﬀ before deviation because.
e−β (yH − yL) > e−β (yH − yL) ≥ EH−EL. So the deviation is proﬁtable for the deviators. When α ∈ (0, 1),
the expected income from search is e−βyL − EL for the low skilled, and e−αˆβ (yH − yL) + e−βyL − EH for
the type H job seekers, where αˆ should be pinned down by workers' indiﬀerence condition e−αˆβ (yH − yL) =
EH−EL. However, this condition is incompatible for any α < 1 with our condition e−βyH−EH ≥ e−βyL−EL.
So that it is impossible that job seekers are indiﬀerent from being high or low skilled.
All in all, we have proved that when the conﬁguration of parameters is such that e−βyH − EH >
e−βyL − EL, the only equilibrium is all the job seekers choose to obtain high skill, i.e. α∗ = 1. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium labor allocation and skill investment choice are socially optimal.
Proof. We derive the proof for Notion 2, the proof for Notion 1 can be analogously derived. By deﬁnition
of q, we have qH =
NH
M and qL =
NL
M - all ﬁrms will attract both skill types. Since NH = αN and
NL = (1− α)N , we have qH = αβ and qL = (1− α)β. When α = 1 or α = 0, there is only one skill level
present in the market; when α ∈ (0, 1), there are both high and low skilled. Deﬁne a priority rule R ∈ [0, 1],
which is the probability of choosing high skilled job applicants when both high and low skilled are present
in the same ﬁrm. The planner chooses α, which hence determines qH and qL, to maximize the aggregate
output
M ×
[
(1− e−qH ) (R× (1− e−qL) + e−qL) yH
+ (1− e−qL) ((1−R) (1− e−qH ) + e−qH ) yL
]
−N × (αEH + (1− α)EL)
The objective program can be rearranged to the following way
M ×
[
(1− e−qL) (1− e−qH )× [RyH + (1−R) yL]
+e−qLyH + e−qHyL − e−βyH − e−βyL
]
−N × (αEH + (1− α)EL)
Whenever we are with corner solutions on α, i.e. qH = 0 or qL = 0, the expression does not depend on
R. When the solution on α is interior, qH and qL are both positive. And if we maximize with respect to R,
we have (1− e−qH ) (1− e−qL) (yH − yL) > 0, so that setting Rp = 1 is the optimal choice. By doing so, we
could further reduce the objective to
M × [(1− e−qH ) yH + e−qH (1− e−qL) yL]
−N × (αEH + (1− α)EL)
Now the derivative with respect to α yields
=N︷︸︸︷
Mβ × [e−αβ (yH − yL)]
−N × (EH − EL)
where the ﬁrst line represents the marginal gain from assigning 1% more workers to the high skilled
section, and the second line represents the corresponding marginal loss. For values of β such that the
marginal gain surpasses the marginal loss, the planner will set α = 1, in which case a threshold βˆp is
determined by eβˆ
p
(yH − yL) = EH − EL, such that for values of β not larger than this threshold pinned
down by the log-return to skills, the planner ﬁnds socially optimal to assign all workers to the high skilled
sector. When the skill to return is such that (yH − yL) < EH − EL, for all values of β the marginal gain
will be lower than the marginal loss, the planner will choose αp = 0. At last if β satisﬁes β > βˆp, such that
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the log-return to skill investment is not high enough to oﬀset the market competition (captured by β), there
is an αp ∈ (0, 1) (an interior solution) which is determined by e−αpβ (yH − yL) = EH − EL such that the
planner will recommend ex ante identical workers to randomize on skill choice and a fraction αp will end
up high skilled. It is straightforward to notice that the correspond values of qpH = α
pβ and qpL = (1− αp)β
correspond to the equilibrium allocation.
As a summary, we have shown that the threshold for skill investment βˆp coincides with βˆ, and αp
conincides with α∗. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3: Under the above assumptions, there exist two thresholds βˆ2 and βˆ1 with 0 < βˆ2 < βˆ1 < βˆ,
such that
(1) When 0 < β < βˆ2, there exists a unique equilibrium in which both group a and group b invest in high
skill, (aH, bH). At β = βˆ2, both (aH, bH) and (aH, bL) can be equilibrium.
(2) When βˆ2 < β < βˆ1, there exists a unique equilibrium in which group a invest in high skill while group
b in low skill, (aH, bL). At β = βˆ1, both (aL, bH) and (aH, bL) can be equilibrium.
(3) When βˆ1 < β ≤ βˆ, there exist multiple equilibria. Either group a invest in high skill and group b in
low skill, or group a invest in low skill and group b invest in high skill, (aL, bH) or (aH, bL).
Proof. Holding group b high skilled, group a's best response depends on the comparison between UP1aH (β)
and UP3aL (β). On one hand, since q
P1
aH (β) > β, we have
UP1aH
(
βˆ
)
= e−q
P1
aH(βˆ)yH − EH < e−βˆyH − EH = e−βˆyL − EL = UP3aL
(
βˆ
)
On the other hand, since qP1aH is increasing in β, when β → 0, we have UP1aH (β) → yH − EH which is
greater than UP3aL (0) = yL−EL. Due to the continuity of UP1aH (β) and UP3aL (β) on β, there exists at least one
βˆ1 < βˆ such that U
P1
aH
(
βˆ1
)
= UP3aL
(
βˆ1
)
. According to the assumptions on the uniqueness of the intersection
point, we have UP1aH (β) > U
P3
aL (β) for β < βˆ1, and U
P1
aH (β) < U
P3
aL (β) for β > βˆ1.
Holding group b low skilled, group a's best response depends on the comparison between UP2aH and U
P4
aL .
It turns out that for all values of β < βˆ
UP2aH = e
−γβ (yH − yL) + e−βyL − EH > e−βyH − EH > e−qP4aHyL − EL = UP4aL
where the last inequality is due to the fact that e−βyH − EH ≥ e−βyL − EL for all β ≤ βˆ and qP4aH > β,
implying that choosing high skill is a dominant strategy for group a when group b choose low skill.
Holding group a high skilled, group b's best response depends on the comparison between UP1bH and U
P2
bL .
On one hand, we have
UP1bH
(
βˆ
)
= 1−e
−qP1bH(βˆ)
qP1bH(βˆ)
e−q
P1
aH(βˆ)yH − EH < e−βˆyH − EH = e−βˆyL − EL = UP2bL
(
βˆ
)
where the ﬁrst inequality is due to the fact that 1−e
−qP1bH(βˆ)
qP1bH(βˆ)
e−q
P1
aH(βˆ) < e−q
P1
aH(βˆ) and qP1aH (β) > β. On
the other hand, since qP1aH (β) and q
P1
bH (β) are increasing in β, when β → 0, we have UP1bH (β) → yH − EH
which is greater than UP2bL (0) = yL − EL. Due to the continuity of UP1bH (β) and UP2bL (β) on β, there exists
at least one βˆ2 < βˆ such that U
P1
bH
(
βˆ2
)
= UP2bL
(
βˆ2
)
. According to the assumptions on the uniqueness of
the intersection point, we have UP1bH
(
βˆ2
)
> UP2bL
(
βˆ2
)
for β < βˆ2, and U
P1
bH
(
βˆ2
)
< UP2bL
(
βˆ2
)
for β > βˆ2.
Holding group a low skilled, group b's best response depends on the comparison between UP3bH and U
P4
bL .
It turns out that for all values of β ≤ βˆ we have
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UP3bH = e
−(1−γ)β (yH − yL) + e−βyL − EH
> e−βyH − EH
≥ e−βyL − EL
> 1−e
−qP4bL (β)
qP4bL (β)
e−q
P4
aL(β)yL − EL
where the last inequality is due to the fact that e−β > e−q
P4
aL > 1−e
−qP4bL (β)
qP4bL (β)
e−q
P4
aL(β), implying that choosing
high skill is a dominant strategy for group b when group a choose low skill.
To summarize, for values of β ∈
(
0, βˆ2
)
, both groups choosing high skill, i.e. (aH, bH), is the unique
equilibrium; for β ∈
(
βˆ2, βˆ1
)
, group a choosing high skill and group b choosing low skill, i.e. (aH, bL) is the
unique equilibrium; When β ∈
(
βˆ1, βˆ
)
, both (aH, bL) and (aL, bH) are possible to appear as equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Corollary. Compared to the case without discrimination,
(1) In (aH, bH) equilibrium, ﬁrms always earn higher expected proﬁts; in In (aH, bL) equilibrium and
(aL, bH), ﬁrms earn lower expected proﬁts.
(2) In (aH, bH) equilibrium, both aH and bH workers earn lower expected payoﬀ; in (aH, bL) equilibrium,
group aH (group bL) earn higher (lower) expected payoﬀ; in (aL, bH) equilibrium, group bH (group aL) earn
higher (lower) expected payoﬀ.
Proof. (1) In (aH, bH) equilibrium, the result is proved in LMD (2005). We prove the case for (aH, bL)
equilibrium. In (aH, bL) equilibrium, ﬁrms' proﬁts are
piP2aH,bL =
(
1− e−qP2H − qP2H e−q
P2
H
)
yH +
[(
qP2H + 1
)
e−q
P2
H − e−β (β + 1)
]
yL
This term is smaller than the proﬁt without discrimination, because
piP2aH,bL =
(
1− e−qP2H − qP2H e−q
P2
H
)
yH +
[(
qP2H + 1
)
e−q
P2
H − e−β (β + 1)
]
yL
<
(
1− e−qP2H − qP2H e−q
P2
H
)
yH +
[(
qP2H + 1
)
e−q
P2
H − e−β (β + 1)
]
yH
=
(
1− e−β − e−ββ) yH
where the inequality uses the fact that (x+ 1) e−x is a decreasing function and qP2H < β. The proof for
the case of (aL, bH) equilibrium can be analogously reproduced.
(2) For the case (aH, bH), it follows from LMD (2005). For the case of (aH, bL). We have
UP2aH = e
−γβ (yH − yL) + e−βyL − EH
> e−βyH − EH
> e−q
S
aHyH − EH
where the ﬁrst inequality comes from e−γβ − e−β > 0.
and
UP2bL = e
−βyL − EL
< e−βyH − EH
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where the inequality comes from the fact that β ≤ βˆ. The proof for the case of (aL, bH) equilibrium can
be analogously reproduced. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4. Let γ ≥ 12 so that group a is the majority. There are four thresholds ψˆaL,b ≤ ψˆbH,a <
ψˆbL,a < ψˆaH,b, such that
(1) For ψ ∈
[
0, ψˆaL,b
)
, the unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is (aL, bL); for ψ = ψˆaL,b, the equilib-
rium can be (aL, bL) or (aL, bH). (2) For ψ ∈
(
ψˆaL,b, ψˆbH,a
)
, the unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is
(aL, bH); (3) For ψ ∈
(
ψˆbH,a, ψˆbL,a
)
, there is no pure strategy nash equilibrium; for ψ = ψˆbL,a, the equi-
librium is (aH, bL); (4) For ψ ∈
(
ψˆbL,a, ψˆaH,b
)
, the unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is (aH, bL); at
the point ψ = ψˆaH,b, the equilibrium can be (aH, bL) or (aH, bH). (5) For ψ ∈
(
ψˆaH,b, 1
)
, the unique pure
strategy nash equilibrium is (aH, bH). (6) Deﬁne the threshold ψˆ of skill investment without discrimination
as ψˆyH
1−e−β
β − EH = ψˆyL 1−e
−β
β − EL; then ψˆbL,a < ψˆ < ψˆaH,b.
Proof. The payoﬀ matrix is as follows.
bH bL
aH
bH: e−γβ 1−e
−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β ψyH − EH
aH:
1−e−γβ
γβ ψyH − EH
bL: e−γβ 1−e
−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β ψyL − EL
aH:
1−e−γβ
γβ ψyH − EH
aL
bH:
1−e−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β ψyH − EH
aL: e−(1−γ)β 1−e
−γβ
γβ ψyL − EL
bL: e−γβ 1−e
−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β ψyL − EL
aL:
1−e−γβ
γβ ψyL − EL
Deﬁne ψˆaH,b by e
−γβ 1−e−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β ψyH − EH = e−γβ 1−e
−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β ψyL − EL.
Deﬁne ψˆaL,b by
1−e−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β ψyH − EH = e−γβ 1−e
−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β ψyL − EL.
Deﬁne ψˆbH,a by
1−e−γβ
γβ ψyH − EH = e−(1−γ)β 1−e
−γβ
γβ ψyL − EL.
Deﬁne ψˆbL,a by
1−e−γβ
γβ ψyH − EH = 1−e
−γβ
γβ ψyL − EL.
When γ ≥ 12 , it can be veriﬁed that ψˆaL,b ≤ ψˆbH,a < ψˆbL,a < ψˆaH,b. (1) We ﬁrst prove for values of
ψ ∈
[
0, ψˆaL,b
)
, the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium is (aL, bL): group a choose low skill, group b
choose low skill. Holding group b high skilled, group a choose to be low skilled, because ψ < ψˆaL,b < ψˆbH,a.
Holding group b low skilled, group a choose to be low skilled, because ψ < ψˆaL,b < ψˆbL,a. Holding group a
high skilled, group b choose to low skilled, because ψ < ψˆaL,b < ψˆaH,b. Holding group a low skilled, group
b choose to be low skilled, because ψ < ψˆaL,b. At the point ψ = ψˆaL,b, the equilibrium can be (aL, bH) or
(aL, bL).
(2) We prove for values of ψ ∈
(
ψˆaL,b, ψˆbH,a
)
, the unique Nash pure strategy equilibrium is (aL, bH).
Holding group b high skilled, group a choose to be low skilled, because ψ < ψˆbH,a. Holding group b low
skilled, group a choose to be low skilled, because ψ < ψˆbH,a < ψˆbL,a. Holding group a high skilled, group b
choose to low skilled, because ψ < ψˆbH,a < ψˆaH,b. Holding group a low skilled, group b choose to be high
skilled, because ψ > ψˆaL,b. At the point ψ = ψˆbH,a, the unique equilibrium is (aL, bH).
(3) We prove for values of ψ ∈
(
ψˆbH,a, ψˆbL,a
)
, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium is (aL, bH).
Holding group b high skilled, group a choose to be high skilled, because ψ > ψˆbH,a. Holding group b low
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skilled, group a choose to be low skilled, because ψ < ψˆbL,a. Holding group a high skilled, group b choose
to low skilled, because ψ < ψˆbL,a < ψˆaH,b. Holding group a low skilled, group b choose to be high skilled,
because ψ > ψˆaL,b. At the point ψ = ψˆbL,a, the unique equilibrium is (aH, bL).
(4) We prove for values of ψ ∈
(
ψˆbL,a, ψˆaH,b
)
, there is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (aH, bL).
Holding group b high skilled, group a choose to be high skilled, because ψ > ψˆbH,a. Holding group b low
skilled, group a choose to be high skilled, because ψ > ψˆbL,a. Holding group a high skilled, group b choose
to low skilled, because ψ < ψˆaH,b. Holding group a low skilled, group b choose to be high skilled, because
ψ > ψˆaL,b. At the point ψ = ψˆaH,b, the equilibrium can be (aH, bL) or (aH, bH).
(5) We prove for values of ψ ∈
(
ψˆaH,b, 1
)
, there is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (aH, bH).
Holding group b high skilled, group a choose to be high skilled. Holding group b low skilled, group a choose
to be high skilled. Holding group a high skilled, group b choose to high skilled, because ψ < ψˆaH,b. Holding
group a low skilled, group b choose to be high skilled, because ψ > ψˆaL,b.
(6) At last, notice that ψˆ = EH−ELyH−yL ×
(
1−e−β
β
)−1
, ψˆbL,a =
EH−EL
yH−yL ×
(
1−e−γβ
γβ
)−1
, and ψˆaH,b =
EH−EL
yH−yL ×
(
e−γβ 1−e
−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β
)−1
. It is straightforward to verify that ψˆbL,a < ψˆ < ψˆaH,b because
(
1−e−γβ
γβ
)−1
<(
1−e−β
β
)−1
<
(
e−γβ 1−e
−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β
)−1
. Q.E.D.
29
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.02
